THIRD PARTIES AS BENEFICIARIES OF CONTRACTORS\u27 SURETY BONDS by CORBIN, ARTHUR L.
YALE
LAW JOURNAL
Vol. XXXVIII NOVEMBER, 1928 No. I
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The American Law Institute has tentatively adopted the two
following general rules:'
"A gift promise in a contract creates a duty of the promisor
to the donee beneficiary to perform the promise. This duty can
be enforced by the donee beneficiary for his own benefit."
"A promise to discharge the promisee's duty [to another
person] creates a duty of the promisor to the creditor beneficiary
to perform the promise."
Around these statements is built up a system of other rules
governing the relations of the beneficiary with both the promisor
and the promisee. These rules represent the presently existing
American law; but it has been arrived at only after more than
a century of litigation, with an immense amount of conflict in
decision and in the forms in which the law has been stated by
the courts. These conflicting decisions and statements fill our
reports and are still cited indiscriminately as authority, thus
propagating further litigation and conflict.
It may seem unfortunate that the law of a great industrial
democracy must be built up by such a slow, uncertain, and costly
process; but the limitations of the human mind and experience
appear to make it inevitable. It will be a vitally serious reproach
to the science of jurisprudence, however, if the law cannot now
be so stated as to avoid another century of conflict over the
same issues. A well-trained lawyer should now be able to advise
his clients with assurance and to save the economic waste of
litigation. Every effort should therefore be made to improve
and clarify the work of the Institute by constructive criticism,
and to support its authority. This is particularly true in sub-
jects where the existing conflict and uncertainty are not due
I CoNTRACTs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1926) §§ 105, 16.
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so much to differences of opinion on social policy as to mere
complexity of legal relations and confused methods of analysis.
Wherever a contract involves three or more parties instead of
two, their legal relations increase by geometrical progression.
This is the chief reason for the complexity, conflict and uncer-
tainty in the law of suretyship and in the law of third party
beneficiaries.
Parties affected by surety bonds. The giving of surety bonds
to secure the performance of building and construction con-
tracts, both public and private, is now a large part of the com-
mercial surety's business. Such bonds create legal relations
among at least four kinds of parties: (1) the owner for whom
the construction work is being done-the direct obligee in the
bond; (2) the principal contractor or obligor who is responsi-
ble for the construction work and who hires labor and buys
material; (3) the laborers, materialmen, and subcontractors,
whose work and material go into the construction; (4) the
surety, who promises to answer for the defaults of the principal
contractor. Still other parties than these sometimes attempt
to secure advantages under the bond, but they will not be con-
sidered in this article. With the legal relations between the
owner and the principal contractor, between the owner and
the surety, and between the principal and the surety, we have
at present nothing to do. They are the parties who make the
contracf and execute the bond. Our problem here is to deter-
mine the relations between the surety on the bond and the lab-
orers, materialmen, and subcontractors. Does the bond create
rights in these last named parties against the surety? Are
they third party beneficiaries of the surety bond so that they can
compel payment for their labor and materials by the surety?
These questions have already caused an immense amount of
costly and unnecessary litigation. There is much apparent and
some actual conflict among the court decisions, a fact that is
bound to continue to breed more costly and unnecessary litigation.
It is typical of our continuing struggle for law, a struggle for
uniformity that can be used as a basis for future predictions,
in a huge community with some fifty nearly independent juris-
dictions. Simplicity and a greater degree of certainty can be
achieved; but it will require the active efforts and co-operation
of many jurists possessed of a high degree of political and judi-
cial intelligence. The result can be achieved by clearly stating
and regularly applying what is already the generally prevailing
law, totally abandoning minority views not supported by the
social interest, and frankly repudiating outworn dogmas.
We should now start with the general proposition that two
contracting parties have power to create rights in a third party.
This has long been a general rule; it is not an "exception."
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"Privity" is not necessary: the third party need not be a "prom-
isee," nor need he give consideration. Secondly, it is not neces-
sary to the creation of rights in the third party against the
promisor that the promisee should owe any legal, equitable, or
moral duty to the third party. This, also, has long been the
prevailing rule; 2 but there is a line of cases stating the con-
trary,3 though very often keeping the actual decision in harmony
with it. And thirdly, the third party has an enforceable right
if the surety promises in the bond, either in express words or
by reasonable implication, to pay money to him. If there is
such a promissory expression as this, there need be no discus-
sion of "intention to benefit." We need not speculate for whose
benefit the contract was made, or wonder whether the promisee
was buying the promise for his own selfish interest or for philan-
thropic purposes. It is a much simpler question, did the surety
promise to pay money to the plaintiff?
A "simpler" question, but not always a simple one. There
will continue to be badly drawn bonds, although clarifying the
law would tend toward improvement in draftsmanship. A fair
share of the past litigation has been due to doubtful interpre-
tation; such litigation cannot altogether be avoided. Nor is
it meant that "intention to benefit" can be wholly eliminated
from third party beneficiary law. It is merely asserted that in
the case of a surety bond for the payment of money, if there is
a promise to pay money to an ascertainable person, the fact
that he is a third person who gave no consideration for the
promise does not prevent him from enforcing it. The fact that
he was not identified at the time of making the contract does
not prevent him from being "ascertainable" at the time for
performance.
Is a third party's right dependcnt on az intcntion to bcnefit
him? The recognition of a right in a third person is often
thought to depend upon the intention of the contracting parties,
particularly that of the promisee who pays for the promise in
question, to confer a benefit upon him. This has been variously
expressed in scores of cases.- But the ideas that lie behind such
9 ANsoN, CONTR%=cTS (Corbin's ed. 1924) § 288; 1 WILLISTON, CONTICIS
(1920) § 368.
3 Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 2S0 (1S77); Jefferson v. Asch, 53 Minn.
446, 55 N. W. 604 (1893).
4"t is not to be denied that the performance of the condition of the
bond to Boyd would have worked consequentially a Uncfit to Simson, if it
had been performed by the payment of the P500 and interest to him. It
might then be said, in a way, to have been a benefit to him in the e~:ecu-
tion of it. But it is not every promise made by one to another, from
the performance of which a benefit may ensue to a third, which gives a
right of action to such third person, he being neither privy to the can-
tract, nor to the consideration. The contract must be made for his bnefit
YALE LAW JOURNAL
terms as "purpose", "motive," and "intention" are obscure and
elusive, as has been found in the criminal law as well as the civil.
as its object, and he must be the party intended to be benefited." Simson
v. Brown, 68 N. Y. 355 (1877).
"According to good sense and upon principle there is no reason why a
person may not maintain an action upon a contract, although not a party
to it, when the parties to the contract intend that he may do so. The
formal or immediate parties to a contract are not always the persons
who have the most substantial interest in its performance. Sometimes a
third person is exclusively interested in its fulfillment. If the parties
choose to treat him as the primary party in interest, they recognize him
as a privy in fact to the consideration and promise. And the result of
the better considered decisions is that a third person may enforce a con-
tract made by others for his benefit, whenever it is manifest from the
nature or terms of the agreement that the parties intended to treat him
as the person primarily interested." Austin v. Seligman, 18 Fed. 519
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1883).
"To entitle him to an action the contract must have been made for his
benefit. He must be the party intended to be benefited.' Garnsey v.
Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233 (1872).
"It must appear that the contract was made and was intended for his
benefit. The fact that he is incidentally named in the contract, or that the
contract, if carried out according to its terms, would inure to his benefit,
is not sufficient to entitle him to demand its fulfillment. It must appear
to have been the intention of the parties to secure to him personally the
benefit of its provisions." Sayward v. Dexter, 72 Fed. 758 (C. C. A. 9th,
1896).
"There must not only be an intent to secure some benefit to such third
person but the contract must have been made and entered into directly
and primarily for his benefit." Searles v. Flora, 225 Ill. 167, 80 N. E. 98
(1907).
"It seems equally clear to us that, whenever two parties enter into
an agreement that appears to have been made expressly for the benefit
of a third party, and such agreement has a good and sufficient considera-
tion, the" agreement itself creates all the privity there need be between
the person-for whose benefit the agreement was entered into and the
party assuming the obligation, and an action at law should lie regardless
of whether there was any obligation existing betweeii the other party to
the agreement and the third party. But, before the third party can adopt
the agreement entered into and recover thereon, he must show clearly
that it was entered into with the intent on the part of the parties thereto
that such third party should be benefited thereby. This intent might, in
a given case, sufficiently appear from the contract itself, but it must
frequently be shown by other proof." Fry v. Ausman, 29 S. D. 30, 135
N. W. 708 (1912).
In Merchants Trust Co. v. Ummach, 228 Ill. App. 67 (1923), the court
said: "It is not necessary that the obligation shall have been undertaken
S..directly or primarily for the benefit of the third person. The
liability of the promisor to the third party . . . depends merely upon
the question of whether the third party has a beneficial interest in the
enforcement of the contract." This begs the question, in case by "bene-
ficial interest" the court means a legal right; opinions not infrequently
beg the question in this way. If by "beneficial interest" the court means
some factual interest other than a legal right, it is far too broad to be
an accurate test.
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When a contract is made, the two or more contracting parties
have separate purposes; each is stimulated by various motives,
of some of which he may not be acutely conscious. The con-
trac" itself has no purpose, motive, or intent. The two parties
have purposes, motives, and intentions; but they never have
quite the same ones.
In third party cases, the right of such party does not depend
upon the purpose, motive, or intent of the promisor. The mo-
tivating cause of his making the promise is usually his desire
for the consideration given by the promisee. In few cases will
he be moved by a desire to benefit a third person. If A buys
Blackacre of B and promises B to pay the price to C, he makes
this promise in order to get Blackacre, not to benefit C; and this
is true whether C is a creditor of B's, or is B's dearly beloved
daughter, or is a home for imbeciles. In determining the rights
of a third party we can disregard the purposes and motives of
the promisor, after we once determine that he has made a
legally operative contract with his promisee.
How is it with the purposes and motives of the promisee?
If B conveys Blackacre to A in return for A's promise to pay
$1000 to B's dearly beloved daughter C, it will usually be a de-
sire to make C happy and comfortable that motivates B and
causes him to convey his land to A. There is a purpose and
intent to "benefit" C by making her a gift of money. This
"intent to benefit" C is given weight by the courts and the pre-
vailing law is that C has a right against A. Suppose, however,
that C is Shylock to whom B owes $1000 in life blood with com-
pound interest. No love is lost on C in this case; and yet B
makes the identical contract that he made above. B conveys
Blackacre to A in return for A's promise to pay $1000 to B's
dearly hated creditor C. Here, too, the prevailing law is that C
has a right against A. It is certain that "intention to benefit"
cannot be identified with love and affection. It is now a desire
to escape from C's clutches that motivates B and causes him to
convey his land to A. Of course, a difference in legal result
could be made between these two cases, giving C a right against
A in the one case and not in the other; but such is not the pre-
vailing law.5 Some courts have indeed made such a difference;
'In Silver King Coalition Mfg. Co. v. Silver King Consol. 3fg. Co., 20-
Fed. 166 (C. C. A. Sth, 1913), the defendant had promised one who had
trespassed on the plaintiff's nine to discharge all of the trcspazer's
obligation. The court realized that the contracting parties were in fact
trying to defraud the plaintiff rather than to benefit it, but sustained a
bill in equity to enforce the contract as a short cut to avoid circuity of
action. "In such a suit it is sufficient that the grantee has agrced with
the grantor to be primarily liable for the latter's obligation to the creditor,
so that, as between the parties to the agreement, the firzt is the principal
and the second the surety. The creditor of the surety is then entitled in
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but they do not agree in the difference that they make. One
court will hold that creditor C has no right, because B had no
desire to "benefit" him, or because it would be unjust to make
A liable to two suits.0 Another court will deny a remedy to
daughter C because B owed her no legal duty that would be
discharged by the promised payment.7
Since the prevailing law now is that C has a right against A
in each of the albove cases, they should be separately explained
and not be alike based upon the indefinite phrase "intent to
benefit." In both contracts alike, A promised a specified per-
formance. In both alike, B desired that performance and paid
equity to be substituted in his place, and to maintain his suit against
the grantee to the same extent as the grantor could have maintained it,
and it is immaterial whether the contract was made and intended for
the benefit of the creditor or of the grantor, for the creditor has all the
rights of both to enforce the obligation of the grantee." In this case
the court did more for the plaintiff than to put it in the place of the
promisee because the promisee could itself probably not have enforced
the defendant's contract.
6 "Another exception is where the plaintiff is the beneficiary solely
interested in the promise, as where one person contracts with another to
pay money or deliver some valuable thing to a third. But where a debt
already exists from one person to another, a promise by a third person
to pay such debt being primarily for the benefit of the original debtor,
and to relieve him from liability to pay it (there being no novation), lie
has a right of action against the promisor for his own indemnity; and if
the original creditor can also sue, the promisor would be liable to two
separate actions, and therefore the rule is that the original creditor
cannot sue." Second Nat'l Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. 123 (1878).
The same reasoning was used in Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts 182 (Pa. 1837).
Cases denying a remedy to a creditor beneficiary find it easy to do so,
with an appearance of consistency with other decisions, by saying that the
contracting parties did not make the contract for the benefit of the plain.
tiff. See In re Gubelman, 13 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
7The case most often cited is Vrooman v. Turner, supra note 3. See
also Wilbur v. Wilbur, 17 R. I. 295, 21 Atl. 497 (1891); Jefferson v. Asch,
suprgi note 3; Dickinson v. McCoppin, 121 Ark. 414, 181 S. W. 151 (1915).
"To give a third party who may derive a benefit from the performance
of the promise an action, there must be, first, an intent by the promlsee
to secure some benefit to the third party; and second, some privity
between the two, the promisee and the party to be benefited, and some
obligation or duty owing from the former to the latter which would give
him a legal or equitable claim to the benefit of the promise or an equiva-
lent from him personally. It is true there need be no privity between
the promisor and the party claiming the benefit of the undertaking, neither
is it necessary that the latter should be privy to the consideration of the
promise, but it does not follow that a mere volunteer can avail himself
of it. A legal obligation or duty of the promisee to him will so connect
him with the transaction as to be a substitute for any privity with the
promisor, or the consideration of the promise, the obligation of the promisee
furnishing an evidence of the intent of the latter to benefit him, and
creating a privity by substitution with the promisor." Vrooman v. Turner,
supra.
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for it, although the antecedent motivating causes of his action
were very different. In both alike, the performance would re-
sult in the direct pecuniary benefit of C, his benefit in the second
case being a bird in the hand in place of one in the bush. In
the one case it would come as a gift accompanied by love and
affection and in the other case it would not. In both cases, B
contemplated the specific result that affected the interest of C
and "intended" that exact result. In both cases enforcement at
the suit of C would produce the "intended" result with the
least amount of litigation and expense. The following is an
attempt at a consistent statement of the generally prevailing
law: a third party who is not a promisee and who gave no
consideration has an enforceable right by reason of a contract
made by two others (1) if he is a creditor of the promisee or
of some other person and the contract called for a performance
by the promisor in satisfaction of the obligation; or (2) if the
promised performance would be of pecuniary benefit to him,
and the contract was so expressed as to give the promisor rea-
son to know that such benefit was contemplated by the promisee
as one of the motivating causes of his making the contract. A
third party may be included within both of these provisions
at once, but need not be., One who is included within neither
of them has no right, even though performance will incidentally
benefit him.
In a few cases the court has recognized the uncertainty of
"intent to benefit" and has fallen back on doubtful distinctions
in degree of benefit. Thus one court said, in a case that was
well decided: 9
"The test of the third person's right of action seems to
depend upon the question as to whether the promise is made
primarily for the benefit of the other party to the contract or of
the third person, that is to say, whether the payment is in re-
lief of the promisee and the fact that the money is to be paid
to the third person is merely a matter of arrangement or con-
venience for the other party to the contract, or whether the pri-
mary purpose and object of the promise are to benefit the third
s Although the right of a creditor beneficiary does not depend upon the
intention of the promisee, there are cases where the intention to benefit
the creditor is obvious. In one case, by arrangement with the creditor, the
promisee insured his life, with the creditor as beneficiary, in order to give
security to the creditor. Walton L. & T. Co. v. Runyan, 269 Fed. 1Q0
(C. C. A. 5th, 1920). The same may have been the arrangement in In re
Newland, Fed. Cas. No. 10, 171 (S. D. N. Y. 1S73).
In cases basing the right of a creditor beneficiary upon the "aszet"
theory or the "subrogation" theory, it is recognized that the right is not
dependent upon any intention of the contracting parties to bencfit the
third party. Silver King C. Mfg. Co. v. Silver King Con-ol. Mfg. Co.,
supra note 5.
9 See Brill v. Brill, 282 Pa. 276, 230, 127 Atl. S40, 842 (1925).
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person. Of course, this distinction cannot exist in an absolute
sense, because in every case there is presumably some benefit ac-
cruing to the promisee or else the contract would not have been
so made and, on the other hand, there is also presumably some
benefit accruing to the third person, by virtue of the fact that
he is to be the recipient of the payment. But while, therefore,
both the promisee and the third person no doubt receive some
benefit in every such contract, the determining question is, whose
interest and benefit are primarily subserved and as a matter of
paramount purpose."
It is clear that if the "primary" and "paramount" purpose
seems to be the benefit of the third person, as in the case of all
sole and donee beneficiaries, he should have an enforceable right
as the court says. But rights have not been limited so nar-
rowly as this. In the case of most creditor beneficiaries, it is
the purpose and intent of the promisee to procure the discharge
of his obligation. The attainment of this end involves benefit
both to himself and to his creditor. This "benefit" he intends to
bring about as an entirety, having no idea in his own mind as to
its division between the persons receiving it or as to "primary"
or "paramount" purpose. Neither should the court make such a
division. It should content itself with bringing about the entire
result that the promised performance would attain. That re-
sult was the "paramount" object of desire and that result
was the "primarily" intended result, including not only the
ultimate end in view but also the means used to bring it about.
The great majority of the courts attain this desired result in full
by giving a remedy to the creditor against the promisor. The
question is not "whose interest and benefit are primarily sub-
served," but what was the performance contracted for and what
is the best way to bring it about.
There is a code provision in California and some other west-
ern states that a third person may enforce a contract if it was
."made expressly for his benefit." This provision should not be
held to require "express" words, either written or oral, that the
promisee is motivated by a desire to confer a benefit upon the
third person. The code provision is merely a provision attempt-
ing to express the modern common law empowering contractors
to confer rights on third persons. It does not exclude creditor
beneficiaries or attempt to state a formal line of distinction be-
tween intended beneficiaries and incidental ones. 0
10 In Goff v. Ladd, 161 Cal. 257, 118 Pac. 792 (1911); the facts were
these. The plaintiff sued T and got judgment. T gave an appeal bond
with surety. The surety required and received the written promise of P
and H that they "would pay such judgment as the court on appeal might
award." The judgment was not paid, T died insolvent and the surety
is insolvent. It was held that the plaintiff could maintain suit against H
on his promise to the surety. Since it was not merely to reimburse thp
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Classification of bond cases. The fi-st important classifica-
tion is that dividing statutory bonds from non-statutory bonds.,
The second is to divide the non-statutory bonds into those that
promise to pay the third persons and those that do not. Less
important classifications to which some attention must be given
are those separating public construction contracts from private
ones, and cases in which the third person has a power to create
a lien on the obligee's property from those where he has not.
Common law surety bozds. The cases grouped in the note
below are cases of non-statutory bonds where laborers, material-
men or other subcontractors were held to have a right to pay-
ment by the surety.'2  The court believed that there was a
surety but was to pay the plaintiff's judgment, the court thought it -as
"made expressly for the benefit" of the plaintiff within § 1559 of
the California Civil Code; and also, since it was something which the
surety "received from the debtor by way of security," within § 284
of the Code, and hence available to the creditor.
In a state with a similar statute, where a shareholder sold shares and
promised the buyer to lend the price to the corporation to be repaid only
out of earnings, it was held that this was not so much for the benefit of
the corporation that it could use it in defense in an action on notes for
the money so lent. The contrary holding would have been better. Tatem
v. Eglanol Mfg. Co., 45 Mont. 367, 123 Pac. 28 (1912).
-1 "Much confusion has resulted from the failure to distinguish between
statutory bonds for the completion of public works of various hinds and
bonds securing the completion of private contractz Many caes fail, also,
to distinguish the varying conditions contained in the bonds upon which
suit is brought." Maryland Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 15 F. (2d) 253
(W.,,D. Mich. 1926). t//
'1Union S. M. Works v. Dodge, 129 Cal. 390, 62 Pac. 41 (1900); Board
of Education v. Chicago Bondi g & Sur. Co., 218 IIL. App. 20 (1920) ;
Knight & Jillson Co. -. Castle, 172 Ind. 97, S7 N. E. 970 (190) zcblc;
Ochs v. Carnahan Co., 42 Ind. App. 157, 76 N. E. 7SS, SO N. E. 104 (190S)
(conditioned "and shall pay for all material and all help"); Nat'l Surity
Co. v. Foster Lumber Co., 42 Ind. App. 671, S5 N. E. '1S9 (1903); Ring
v. Downey, 24 Ind. App. 262, 56 N. E. 680 (1899) ; William- v. M5arl-Jand,
15 Ind. App. 669, 44 N. E. 562 (1896); Hay v. Hassettl17.1 Iowa 01,
156 N. W. 734 (1916) (conditioned on "full payment of wageO," statute
authorizing suit on bond. by any person "intended to be secured"); Getchcll
Mfg. Co. v. Peterson, 124 Iowa 599, 100 N. W. 550 (1901); Hipwell v.
Nat'l Sur. Co., 130 Iowa 656, 105 N. W. 318 (1906) (city contract);
Baker v. Bryan, 64 Iowa 561, 21 N. W. 83 (1334) (school district, not
necessary that the plaintiff should have giveil credit in reliance on the
bond); Algonite Mfg. Co. v. Fidelity & D. Co.." 100 Kan. 23, 163 Pac. 1070
(1917) (conditioned merely on performance of contract which provided
that contractor should pay all laborers and materialmen); American Fid.
Co. v. State,V12S Md. 50, 97 Atl. 12 (191); National Sur. Co. v. Hall-
Miller D. Co.,t'l04 Mliss. 626, 61 So. 700 (1913); LaCrozse L. Co. v.
Schwartz, 163 Mo. App. 6 9, 147 S. W. 501 (1912); Buffalo Forge Co. v.
Cullen & Stock Mfg. Co.,105 Mo. App. 4S4, 79 S. W. 1024 (1904) (band
provided principal should pay all laborers and tate~r'alr cn); lAov.r v.
Howard, 144 Mo. 671, 46 S. W. 625 (1S98) (city contract); St. Louis
v. Von Phul, 133 Mlo. 561, 34 S. W. 343 (1S96) (bond provided that it
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promise to pay the third party, although in some cases it was
expressed in the form of a "condition" and in others it was
found only by a liberal interpretation of the bond along with
the construction contract. The cases cited include both public
construction contracts and private ones.
A surety bond that is conditioned on full performance of his
contract by the principal, will operate in favor of such third
parties as the principal, by his contract with the promisee,
undertakes to pay; the bond need be no more specific.' 3 The
surety bond may be broader in its terms than was required
by the principal construction contract; but it is an independent
contract and is enforceable according to its own terms.14 Of
course both contracts should be considered together if there is
any doubt or ambiguity as to the interpretation of the bond.
There are cases holding that third parties can enforce provi-
sions in a bond, given to comply with a statutory requirement,
that are in excess of those required by the statute. As to the
excess, the effect of the bond is determined by the common law
rules.35
might "be sued on at the instance of any materialman, laboring man, or
mechanic, in the name of the city"); Forburger Stone Co. v. Lion B. &
Sur. Co., 103 Neb. 202, 170 N. W. 897 (1919); Fitzgerald v. McClay, 47
Neb. 816, 66 N. W. 828 (1896) (state contract) Doll v. Crume, 41 Neb.
655, 59 N. W. 806 (1894); Lyman v. Lincoln, 38 Neb. 794, 57 N. AV.
531 (1894) (city contract); Sample v. fIale, 34 Neb. 220, 51 N. W. 837
(1892) (state contract); Toner v. Long, 79 N. H. 458, 111 Atl. 311 (1920);
Southwestern Port. Cem. Co. v. Williams, 251 Pae 380,'49 A. L. R. 525
(N. M. 1926); Guilford L. Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 177 N. C. 44, 97 S. E.
732 (1918); Orinoco S. Co. v. Shaw L. Co., 160 N. C. 428, 76 S. E. 273
(1912); Gastonia v. Engineering Co., 131 N. C. 363,A 2 S. E. 858 (1902);
Royal Indem. Co. v. Northern Ohio G. & S. Co., 100 Ohio St. 373, 126
N. R. 405 (1919); Dolese Co. v. Chaney, 44 Okla. 745, 145 Pac. 1119
(1914); United States F. & G. Co. v. Thomas, 156 S. W. 573 (Tex. Civ,
App. 1913); M. H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Suret; Co., 60 Utah
435, 11 Pac. 998 (1922) (suits by owner on bond given to company in-
stalling elevators); Yawkey C. L. Co. v. Sinaiko, 189 Wis. 298, 206 N. W.
976 (1926) (against an uncompens9ted surety on a private contract);
Concrete Steel Co. v. Ill. Sur. Co., 163 Wis. 41, 157 N. W. 543 (1916)
(conditioned "shall satisfy all claims and demands"); Connor Co. v. Aetna'
Indemnity Co., 136 Wis. 13, 115 N. W. 811 (1908) (public contract and
promise obtained under mistaken belief that materialmen could have lien);
United States G. Co. v. Gleason, 135 Wis. 539, 116 N. W. 238, 17 L. R. A.
( s.) 906 (1908) (public building).
VW Fogarty v. Davis, 305 Mo. 288, 264 S. W. 879 (1924).
14 National Sur. Co. v. Hall-Miller Dec. Co., 104 Miss. 626, 61 So. 700
(1913); Yawkey C. L. Co. v. Sinaiko, supra note 12.
'5 Puget Sound Bank v. Gallucci, 82 Wash. 445, 144 Pac. 698 (1914)
(bank given judgment for money loaned to the contractor) ; Title Guaranty
& S. Co. v. State, 61 Ind. App. 268, 291, 109 N. E. 237, 111 N. E. 19
(1916) (the board of laborers); Hilton v. Universal Const. Co., 202 Mo.
App. 672, 216 S. W. 1034 (1920); Clatsop Co. v. Feldschau, 101 Ore. 36,
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In any case where the third parties have an enforceable right
as beneficiaries of the bond, the direct promisee in the bond has
no power to discharge the surety's duty to them, whether by
a release, by an extension of time to the principal contractor,
by breaches of his own duties, or by agreeing upon changes in
the principal contract.10 This applies only after the beneficiary
has already become such by having extended credit to the prin-
cipal contractor for labor or material within the terms of the
bond.
The fact that the principal contract is illegal and void, be-
cause of the failure of the municipal promisee to comply with
provisions of a statute or with common law rules of public
policy, will nullify the right of the third party to recover on the
surety bond if he was a participant in or aware of the illegal
conduct.", If he was unaware of the illegal conduct he can
199 Pac. 953 (1921) (camp equipment and clothing for laborers); Cf.
also Philadelphia v. Nichols Co., 214 Pa. 265, 63 Atl. SSG (1900); Bristol
v. Bostwick, 139 Tenn. 304, 202 S. W. 61 (1917).
"Plaintiff furnished labor and material and brought itself w.ithin the
terms of the contract made by defendants. The undertaking, if not ex-
pressly authorized by statute, was not prohibited. It was not against
public policy or good morals, nor in contravention of any statuto. To
hold the undertaking valid and binding is only to compel the dfcndant
to do the thing they bound themselves to do. To hold the bond void upon
a technical construction that it was not a valid statutory bond would be
to leave the plaintiff without the security which it had the right to rely
upon at the time it furnished the labor and materials." Union Shect
Metal Works v. Dodge, supra note 12.
A bond may be operative as a statutory bond even though the oblige
named therein is not the one specified by the statute. Board of Education
v. Grant, 107 Mich. 151, 64 N. W. 1050 (1S95); Stephenson v. Monmouth
M. & M. Co., 84 Fed. 114 (C. C. A. 6th, 1S97); Ihrig v. Scott, 5 Wash.
584, 32 Pac. 466 (1893); Huggins v. Sutherland, 39 Wash. 552, 82 Pac.
112 (1905); Road Supply & 11. Co. v. Kansas C. & S. Co., 121 rKn. 299,
246 Pac. 503 (1926) (held operative in favor of third particz, whether
"regarded as a mere common law bond" or a statutory one).
36 Equitable Sur. Co. v. McMillan, 234 U. S. 448, 34 Sup. Ct. S03 (1913);
Illinois Sur. Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U. S. 376, 37 Sup. Ct. 614 (1917)
(collecting other Supreme Court cases); Aetna Indem. Co. v. Indianapolis
M1. & F. Co., 178 Ind. 70, 98 N. E. 706 (1912); Getchell Mfg. Co. v. Pcter-
son, supra. note 12; Standard A. & R. Co. v. Texas Bldg. Co., 99 Kan. 567,
162 Pac. 299 (1917) ; Kansas City v. Schroeder, 196 Mo. 281, 93 S. W. 405
(1906) ; School Dist. v. Livers, 147 Mo. 580, 49 S. W. 507 (1893) ; Doll v.
Crume, supra note 12; cf. International Trust Co. v. Keefe 31. & I. Co., 40
Colo. 440, 91 Pac. 915 (1907) (obligee can discharge before assent by bene-
ficiary).
- Kansas City H. P. Brick Co. v. National Sur. Co., 157 Fed. 620
(W. D. Me. 1907); National Sur. Co. v. Kansas City H. P. Bricl: Co.,
73 Kan. 196, 84 Pac. 1034 (1906); National Sur. Co. v. Wyandotte C. &
L. Co., 76 Kan. 914, 92 Pac. 1111 (1907) scable.
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rec6ver on the bond; mere constructive notice does not nullify
his right against the surety. 8
There are numerous cases holding that laborers, materialmen,
and other subcontractors have no enforceable right against the
surety, even though the terms of the principal contract make
it the duty of the contractor to pay the third parties, and even
though the surety bond is expressly conditioned on full perform-
ance of all his promises by the contractor.10 Indeed, in some
18 Bell v. Kirkland, 102 linn. 213, 113 N. W. 271 (1907); Kansas City
Brick Co. v. National Sur. Co., 149 Fed. 507 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1906); Na-
tional Sur. Co. v. Wyandotte C. & L. Co., supra note 17; Kansas*City v,
Schroeder, supra note 16. 1
19 Federal Sur. Co. v. Minneapolis S. & M. Co., 17 F. (2d) 242 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1927). (o duty owed by promisee to the plaintiff); Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Johnson, 15 F. (2d) 253 (W. D. Mich. 1926) ("to conclude that the
clause was inserted for protection of third parties is to indulge an un-
warranted confidence in the altruistic motives of those engaged in con-
struction work; . . . indVative of judicial paternalism"); Southern
Sur. Co. v. U. S. Cast Iron Co., 13 F. (2d) 833 (C, C. A. 8th, 1926) (more
indemnity); Eureka Stone Co. v. First Christian Church, 86 Ark. 212, 110
S. W. 1042 (1908); Carolina Pot. Cem. Co. v. Carey, 145 La. 773, 82
So. 887 (1919); Moore v. Manne130 Minn. 318, 153 N. W. 609 (1915);
Jefferson v. Asch, supra note 3 (duty of promisee to third party required).;
Uhrich v. Globe Surety Co., 191 Mo. App. 111, 166 S. W. 845 (1915) (the
contract is poorly interpreted, the court thinking that as the property was
subject to lien the bond was solely for protection of the promisee against
liens); Eau Claire Lumber Co. v. Banks, 136 Mo. App. 44, 117 S. W. 611
(1909) (failed as technical statutory bond, and gave no right as private
bond because nothing to show intent to give thiyd party right); Standard
Gas Power Corp. v. New Eng. Casualty Co., 90 X. J. L. 570, 101 AI.
281 (1917) (held to be indemnity only); Pankey v. National Sur. Co.,
115 Ore. 648, 239 Pac. 808 (1925); Parker v. Jeffery, 26 Ore. 186, 37 Pac.
712 (1894) (but see the subsepent third party beneficiary statute);
Greene Co. v. Southern Sur./Co., 292 Pa. 304, 141 Atl. 27 (1927),; First
M. E. Church v. Isenberg, 246 Pa. 221, 92 Atl. 141 (1914) (obligors on
bond specifically bound themselves to payment of materialmen); Lan-
caster v. Frescoln, 192 Pa. 452, 43 Atl. 961 (1899) 203 Pa. 640,
53 Atl. 508 (1902); Oak Cliff I. Co. v. American Indem. Co., 266
S. W. 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (bond conditioned on payment of laborers
and materialmen held to be indemnity of promisee only); General Bond-
ing Co. v. Waples L. Co., 176 S. W. 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Nat'l
Bank v. Gulf C. & S. F. R. R., 95 Tex. 176, 66 S. W. 203 (1902)
(same condition interpreted not 0o be a promise for benefit of third
parties) ; Blyth-Farco Co. v. Free, 46 Utah 233, 148 Pac. 427 (1915) (bond
was given to "indemnify and save harmless" the company, and contractor
was, by contract, required to pay laborers and materialmen); Smith v.
Bowman, 32 Utah 33, 88 Pac. 687 (1907) (bond given to protect against
liens, and as building Vas public no liens could be had); DuPont Powder
Co. v. Nat'l Sur. Co., 90 Wash. 227, 155 Pac. 1050 (1916) (indemnity
only, distinguishing statutory bonds on public contracts); Spokane Merch.
Ass'n v. Pacific Sur. Co., 86 Wash. 489, 150 Pac. 1054 (1915); Rust v.
U. S. Fidelity & G. Co., 87 Wash. 93, 151 Pac. 248 (1915); Armour &
Co. v. Western Con. Co., 36 Wash. 529, 78 Pac. 1106 (1905).
"It is earnestly urged that, since there could be no lien on the cemetery
CONTRACTORS' SURETY BONDS
of the cases the bond is specifically conditioned on payment of
the debts for labor and material. These cases at times evince
a fondness for the supposed common law rule requiring "pri-
vity;" some cases rest upon the false but still lingering idea
that the third party's right depends upon there being some pre-
existing duty owed to him by the promisee, thus explaining
why the promisee came to make a contract requiring payment
to the third party; and in other cases the court interprets the
contract as solely for the indemnity of the promisee. On the
last of these three grounds, a few of the cases may possibly
be reconciled with the majority cases; but in most of them the
facts and the terms of the contract afford no reasonable basis
for distinction. Cases where such a distinction by interpre-
tation of the contract was reasonable are collected in the suc-
ceeding section.
Does the surety in fact proise to pay the third partics?
In the case of a surety bond given to an owner to assure per-
formance of a building contract, the legal duties of the surety
ought not to be expanded beyond the terms of the surety's
promise. He is paid for his undertadng; but he is not paid
for more than his undertalking. The extent of this undertak-
ing is to be determined not only by the surety's words of ex-
press promise, but also by the "condition" of the bond. Words
of "condition" are not words of "promise" in form; but in the
case of a penal bond they must be construed to be words of
promise, inasmuch as the only express words of promise are
those in which payment of the penal sum is promised. The
alternative seems to be between enforcing the penalty and con-
struing the words of condition as a promise and enforcing that.
The courts have adopted the latter alternative, penalties no
longer being collectible. A bond conditioned to be void on fulfil-
ment by the principal contractor of all of his duties is operative
as a promise either that all those duties will be performed, or
that the promisee will be indemnified within the limit of the pen-
alty in case of non-performance. The cases denying a remedy to
third persons on a private surety bond nearly always interpret
it as exclusively the latter promise and rest the decision on that
ground.
the parties to the bond must have intended thereby to secure payment
to those supplying material and work therefor, as neither they nor the
contractors would, without right of lien, or to execution on judgment,
undertake to supply materials or work for the premises; also that the
marble company knew of and contracted with reference to and on the
faith of the security of the bond. The stipulation does not indicate
whether or not it had such knowledge, nr would these considerations
make any difference in the legal relations." V United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 16 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926).
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A promise to indemnify the promisee against loss is one
that could be fully performed, in many instances, without pay-
ing anything to the third persons.20 Even if they have power
to put a lien on the p'romisee's property, they may not do so
in fact, or the lien that is put on may be disposed of otherwise
than by paying the debt. Such a promise therefore cannot
surely be said to have been "intended" for the benefit of the
third persons, since the promised performance will not neces-
sarily benefit them. And to give the third party a judgment
for his debt would often compel the surety to do more than he
promised to do.
If on reasonable interpretation the surety bond contains no
promise to pay laborers and materialmen, of course they have
no right against the surety. There are numerous cases, even in
states where the rights of third party beneficiaries are fully
recognized, holding that the particular bond in suit contained
no promise to pay the third parties who were suing.21 These
cases show the usual variation in liberality or strictness of
interpretation; but the current of authority now is that the
contract of a compensated surety is to be interpreted liberally
in the interest of the promisee and beneficiaries, rather than
strictly in favor of the surety. Some of the older cases, inter-
preting the bond narrowly and strictly in favor of the surety,
are explainable on the ground that the surety was not compen-
sated and the growth of the commercial suretyship business
had not then taken place.22
The words used in building contracts and in accompanying
surety bonds are now usually such that they are, and should
be, interpreted as a promise by the surety to pay laborers and
20 Thus, in United States F. & G. Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., supra,
note 19, the promisee was already saved harmless. The property involved
was not subject to lien; and hence the materialman was not a "creditor"
of the promisee in any sense. His right on the bond, if any, depended
wholly upon an expression of intent to secure payment to him; and this
was not very obvious.
21Babcock v. American Sur. Co., 236 Fed. 340 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916)
(interpretation altogether too narrow); Searles v. Flora, supra noto 4
(interpretation too narrow); Spalding L. Co. v. Brown, 171 Ill. 487, 49
N. E. 725 (1898); Sterling v. Wolf, 163 Ill. 467, 45 N. E. 218 (1896);
Greenfield L. & I. Co. v. Parker, 159 Ind. 571, 65 N. E. 747 (1902);
Hart v. State, 120 Ind. 83, 21 N. E. 654, 24 N. E. 151 (1889); Green Bay
L. Co. v. Independent Sch. Dist., 121 Iowa 663, 97 N. W. 72 (1903); Hunt
v. King, 97 Iowa 88, 66 N. W. 71 (1896); Marquette Bldg. Co. v. Wilson,
109 Mich. 223, 67 N. W. 123 (1896); Smith v. Bowman, supra note 19
(might well have been interpreted otherwise); Montgomery 'v. Rief, 15
Utah 495, 50 Pac. 623 (1897); Electric Appliance Co. v. United States
Fid. & G. Co., 110 Wis. 434, 851N. W. 648 (1901).
22 See Royal Indem. Co. v. Northern Ohio. G. & S. Co., supra note 12;
Southwestern Port. Cem. Co. v. Williams, supra note 12.
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materialmen in case of default by the contractor. Often the
construction contract contains an express promise by the con-
tractor; and the bond is either conditioned expressly on such
payment or on full performance by the contractor of all his
promises. The third Parties are often definitely indicated in
that part of the bond specifying the conditions. Words of
"condition" are not words of "promise" in form; but in this
class of cases it is sound policy to interpret the words liberally
in favor of the third parties. In a majority of states, it is
already done; and without question the surety's rate of com-
pensation for carrying the risk is sufficiently adjusted to the
law. The compensated surety has become an institution that
is well suited to carry the risk of the principal contractor's
default, whereas individual laborers and materialmen are fre-
quently very ill prepared to carry the risk. The legislatures
have recognized this fact, and in the case of public contracts
have required surety bonds to protect the third parties. While
this has not been done in the case of private construction, and
while the courts should not on their own motion put such a
provision into a private surety bond, they may well interpret
a bond that is expressly conditioned on the payment of laborers
and materialmen as being a promise to pay them and made for
their benefit. The words reasonably permit it, and social policy
approves it.23 The court need not strain the words of the bond,
as has sometimes been done, to hold that the third persons were
not intended as beneficiaries thereof, even though the promisee
may have been thinking chiefly of himself when he paid for the
bond . 4
For whwse benefit is the sarety bond executcd? This is a
question of purposes and motives, a question of complexity and
difficulty, especially when there are several persons involved
whose purposes and motives are not uniform and are frequently
not consciously thought out by the men themselves. Whose
purpose is important: the promisee's, the principal contractor's,
the surety's, or that of the legislature? The full performance
promised by the surety will in every case be economically bene-
ficial to the promisee. He gets either the construction work done
or money damages in its place. This beneficial performance is
undoubtedly his "leading object" of desire. This has caused
many courts to say that he caused the execution of the bond for
23 Korsmeyer P. & H. Co. v. McClay, 43 Neb. 649, 62 N. W. 50 (1895),
and Lyman v. Lincoln, 38 Neb. 794, 57 N. W. 531 (1S94), are cases in
which the words of "condition" were liberally construed as a "promise."
24 If the promisee's property was under no liability to a lien, this fact
is evidence that the provision in the bond was intended for the benefit
of third persons. See Southwestern Port. Cem. Co. v. Williams, spra
note 12.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
his own benefit and not for the benefit' of third parties. Pay-
ment by the surety to the laborers and materialmen will also
be economically beneficial to the promisee in those cases where
these persons have power to put a lien upon the promisee's
property. Payment will extinguish the power and prevent the
lien. In procuring such a bond, therefore, the promisee may
have been motivated by a desire for this result.
If the case is such that no lien is possible and the promisee
knows it, he will not be so motivated and the payment made to
the third parties will not be economically beneficial to the
promisee. In such a case what motivated the promisee in buy-
ing a promise to pay the third persons? Not a desire for his
own protection, it has been said, since he is under no duty or
liability and the principal contractor's failure to pay the third
persons will do him no direct harm. It is not unreasonable to.
draw the inference, as some courts have done, that his motive
was a desire to give added security to the third persons.2 But
even when the promisee has no duty to the third persons and
his property is under no liability to a lien, it is very generally
recognized that he has something to gain from giving security
to laborers and materialmen upon whom the cost and quality
of the construction work largely depend. If they are held to
have a right on the bond, it brings them added security; such
added security for them is economically beneficial to the promisee
as well, in that the shifting of the risk of non-payment from
the laborers and materialmen to the surety will tend to the
standardization of prices and wages and also of the quality of
labor and materials. 26  In all cases, therefore, whether public
25 "The intention of the parties must control the interpretation of the
contract and such intention must be gathered from the whole instrument.
To hold that the bond in question was not intended for the protection of
third persons would be to say that its second clause is meaningless and for
all practical uses should be stricken from the instrument. One of the
canons of construction is that, if possible, effect must be given to all
parts of the instrument. On defendant's theory what effect could be
given the obligation 'to deliver the work . . . free from all debts or
liens of every character on account of materials furnished or labor per-
formed?' This being a public building no debts made by the contractor
could become a lien or charge on the building or impose any liability on
the board. So far as the protection of the building and of the board was
concerned those words were superfluous; but they were pregnant with
meaning if their purpose was to benefit third persons." La Crosse Lum-
ber Co. v. Schwartz, supra note 12.
28 "Taking it as a cold-blooded business proposition, this clause in the
bond would naturally encourage subcontractors of the best sort to take
contracts to do certain parts of the work; it would tend to prevent the
abandonment of the work by mechanics not promptly paid their wages
by the contractors, who might be suspected to be of doubtful financial
solvency; it would procure the best work and material, and the prompt
services of all workers and subcontractors; and all of this would redound
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or private, the motive of the promisee may have been his own
economic gain.
But after all, what difference does it make what were the
promisee's complex and uncertain purposes or motives? Often
he does not know them himself. It should be enough that the
contract contains a valid promise that the third persons shall
be paid. If there is doubt that such a promise was in fact made,
it may be of some assistance to probe into the heart and the
history of the promisee. It may help occasionally in identifying
the third persons and in interpreting the words of the contract.
In most cases there is little difficulty in identifying the third
persons to be paid or in determining whether or not the surety
promised to pay them. But the third party's right is not de-
pendent upon the promisee's motives. The question is, was pay-
ment to him the factual result agreed upon; was it the promised
performance? 27 If it was, judgment in favor of the third party
is a proper method of reaching that result. The purposes of
the promisee, whatever they were, will be attained with suffi-
cient certainty. The expectations of the third party will not
be disappointed. The interests of the public at large in dis-
tributing the risks of misfortune and in the realization of hopes
will be protected.
In some bonds there is found an express statement that it is
to the benefit of the public. It must be borne in mind that the mechanics,
materialmen, and laborers could have no Hen upon the building, and that
the trustees, representing the state, would not be bound to reserve money
with which to pay their claims; but they would have to depend upon the
contractor alone. Taking these things into consideration, the bond, in a
way, supplied the place of the mechanics' lien law, and thus gave an
additional security to all persons working upon this building and supply-
ing material therefor; and this alone was, in our opinion, of the highest
importance to the state." National Surety Co. v. Hall-Miller Decorating
Co., 104 Mliss. 626, 61 So. 700, 46 L. R. A. (N. s.) 325 (1913).
"Was it intended as security for those furnishing labor or material
for the construction of the building? It is stipulated in the agreement
'that the party of the second part further covenants and agrees to promptly
pay for all labor and materials used' . . . Who then were to be
paid? Manifestly those furnishing the labor and materials. The provision
was for their benefit. No purpose other than this could have been served
by the city, for in no event would it have been liable therefor. The
evident object was to secure subcontractors to the end that they, kmowing
they were secured, would do better work and furnish better material
than if they felt uncertain about their pay." Hipwell v. National Surety
Co., supra note 12.
27 That an intention that the plaintiff shall be paid is enough to satisfy
the requirement that the contract shall be made "for the benefit" of the
plaintiff is recognized in some cases. "If the contract be to pay a debt
due to a third person, presumably it is for his benefit unless it appears
that the contract was not so intended." Concrete Steel Co. v. Illinois Sur.
Co., supra note 12.
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the purpose of the contracting parties to give security to the
third parties described as well as to the promisee. 2  It may
even be provided that the third persons shall have a right of
action in case of non-payment. Such statements should not be
necessary in order to create a right in a third party; but they
show definitely the legal relations that the parties intend to
create.
Is the bond beneficiary a creditor or a donee? If the surety
bond is one that is held to create rights in the laborers and
materialmen, they should be classified among creditor benefi-
ciaries wherever that is believed to make any difference. This
is because in all cases they are creditors of the principal con-
tractor and the promised payment comes to them in satisfac-
tion of the debt. The promised money, therefore, does not come
to them as a gift.
These third persons are not, in a narrow sense of the term,
creditors of the promisee. The principal contractor to whom
they sell their wares or labor is indebted to them; but the
promisee is not. If the surety really promises that they shall
be paid, it is a promise of A to B to pay C's debt to D. But
in a broader sense, the third persons may be regarded as
"creditors" in those cases where they have a power to subject
the promisee's property to a lien. As against the principal con-
tractor, they have a right and he has a duty to pay. As against
the promisee, they have a power to affect his beneficial property
relations and he has a liability that his property may be so
affected.2V 9 Assuming once more that the surety has really
promised to pay the third persons, we have not only a promise
by A to B to pay C's debt to D, but also a promise by A to B
to discharge B's "liability" to D. Under these circumstances,
it is not unreasonable to place the third persons in the category
of creditor beneficiaries.
In the non-lien cases, where the promisee is under neither
duty nor "liability" to the third persons, but the surety never-
theless by reasonable interpretation promises that they shall be
paid, such persons are donees of the promise but are not
donees of the promised payment. Payment by the surety comes
to them at the cost of their claim against the principal con-
28 See Oak Cliff L. Co. v. American Indem. Co., supra note 19, citing
Texas cases.
29 After the lien has been created by compliance with the mechanics lien
law, the laborer has more than a power; he has a "lien," a limited property
interest, like other such interests involving rights and other relations as
well as powers. The promisee has a correspondingly smaller property.
interest; his property rights, powers, privileges and especially his immuni-
ties have been considerably decreased. This does not cause us to say,
however, that the promisee has come under an obligation (duty) to pay
the laborer.
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tractor, although not at the cost of their power to file a lien,
for they have no such power; payment therefore is no gift.
But the promise of the surety, the new security consisting of
a right against the surety, comes to the third persons at no cost
to them. This is true of practically all creditor beneficiaries as
well as donee beneficiaries.
In all these cases alike the laborer or materialman gets one
thing for nothing and that is "security." This is the legal
"right" itself. His own contract created only a right against
the principal contractor; in consideration for that he gave his
labor and materials. His right on the surety bond comes to him
as an additional security by donation. He gives nothing for
it, except that in the gradual adjustment of prices and wages
his compensation tends to become smaller as the risk of non-
payment is thrown upon a commercial surety.
Statutory surety bands. It is frequently provided by statute
that in the case of contracts for public works the contractor
shall give a bond not only to indemnify the municipality for
breach but also to assure payment to sub-contractors, material-
men, and laborers.30 When such a bond is executed in conform-
ity with the statute, it is enforceable against the surety by the
third party beneficiaries described.-, Questions of "privity"
are eliminated; but "intention to benefit" may not be, ince the
soFor illustrative statutes see the following: 33 Stat. 811 (1905), '0
U. S. C. § 270 (1928); ARi. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 6913;
CAL. CODE OF Civ. PROc. (Deering, 1923) § 1203.
31 Illinois Sur. Co. v. John Davis Co., supra note 10; Southwestern P.
Cement Co. v. McElrath Con. Co., 11 F. (2d) 910 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1925);
Aetna C. & S. Co. v. Henslee, 163 Ark. 492, 260 S. W. 414 (1924); Car-
penter v. Furrey, 128 Cal. 665, 61 Pac. 369 (1900); Southern Sur. Co. v.
Dawes, 161 Ga. 207, 130 S. E. 577 (1925) (statute authorized action by
materialman); Aetna Indem. Co. v. Indianapolis Al. & F. Co., 178 Ind.
70, 98 N. E. 706 (1912); Standard A. & R. Co. v. Texas Bldg. Co., 99
Kan. 567, 162 Pac. 299 (1917); McNamara v. McGuire, 254 Mass. 0S9,
150 N. E. 862 (1926); Sampson Co. v. Commonwealth, 202 Masz. 32G,
88 N. E. 911 (1909) (the statute prescribed no mode of enforcement, and
the court held that a petition in equity joining all parties to the bond
was proper); People v. Cotteral, 115 Mich. 43, 73 N. W. 19, 74 N. W. 133
(1897) ; Village of West Duluth v. Norton, 57 Blinn. 72, 58 N. W. 829
(1894); St. Louis v. Hill Const. Co., 175 Mo. App. 555, 158 S. W. 93
(1913); Ingold v. Hickory, 178 N. C. 614, 101 S. E. 525 (1919); Donaldson
v. Benight, 105 Okla. 10S, 232 Pac. 116 (1924); School District v. Alameda
Const. Co., 87 Ore. 132, 169 Pac. 507, 78 (1918); Lancaster v. Frccoln,
supra note 19; semble; Baum v. Whatcom Co., 19 Wash. 620, 54 Pac. 29
(1898).
The rule applicable to "statutes" applies also where a municipal charter
or city ordinance requires the bond. Fite v. Pearson, 215 Ala. 521, 111
So. 15 (1927); Morton v. Power, 33 Blinn. 521, 24 N. W. 194 (185);
Wilson v. Whitmore, 92 Hun 466, ajf'd, 157 N. Y. 693, 51 N. E. 1094 (1893);
Philadelphia v. Nichols Co., spra note 15.
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statute may itself make that the test.3 2  The statute usually
indicates, however, the classes of third persons for whose pro-
tection the statute was passed; and the "intention" of the legis-
lature is substituted for the "intention" of the parties.
Questions arise, also, as to the exact limits of the class of
persons who are within the protection of the statute and as
to the character of claims which the surety is bound to pay
These questions must be answered according to the usual rules
of statutory interpretation. The statute may specify laborers
and materialmen; but what labor and materials are included?
Usually the materials must have been incorporated into the
structure required by the principal contract; and yet blasting
powder consumed in excavation has been included, 34 while money
loaned to the contractor to pay for labor and materials has not
been.33 Those who supply tools and appliances to the contractor
are not ordinarily protected, whether they sell or hire; 8' these
32 Some statutes expressly state that, if a public bond be given, any
party intended to be benefited may sue. In such case, of course, an "in-
tended" beneficiary may sue. Hay v. Hassett, supra note 12.
3 Under the federal statute the surety owes no duty to a person tor-
tiously injured by the contractors; the statute indicates the third party
beneficiaries expressly, and persons injured by tort are not included.
United States v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 18 F. (2d) 203 (C. C. A. 6th,
1927). The Iowa statute was similarly construed in Schisel v. Marvill,
198 Iowa 725, 197 N. W. 662 (1924).
The Michigan statute is construed not to include "subcontractors."
People v. Cotteral, supra note 31; Avery v. Ionia Co., 71 Mich. 538, 39 N.
W. 742 (1888). As to who is a "subcontractor" as opposed to a "material-
man" see People v. Powers, 108 Mich. 339, 66 N. W. 215 (1896); People
v. Collins, 11Z Mich 605, 71 N. W. 153 (1897); People v. Thompson, 119
Mich. 21, 77 N. W. 314 (1898); People v. National Const. Co., 159 Mich.
133, 123 N. W. 801 (1909).
34 National Sur. Co, v. United States, 228 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916);
Sampson Co. v. Commonwealth, supra note 31; Hercules Powder Co. v.
Knoxville etc. R. R. Co., 113 Tenn. 382, 83 S. W. 354 (1904).
3- Southern Sur. Co. v. Holden L. & L. Co., 14 F. (2d) 411. (C. C. A. 8th,
1926); United States v. Rundle, 107 Fed. 227 (C. C. A. 9th, 1901); Oliver
Const. Co. v. Crawford, 142 Miss. 490, 107 So. 877 (1926).
30 National Surety Co. v. United States, 228 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916)
(soap, towels, stovepipe, rat traps, material for outfitting a boarding house
-for laborers, material for repairing boats and machines, drilling machines;
rev'd, as to board of laborers in Brogan v. National Sur. Co., 246 U. S.
257, 38 Sup. Ct. 250 (1918)) ; Pierce Oil Corp. v. Parker, 168 Ark. 400, 271
S. W. 24 (1925) (gasoline used in running a truck used in hauling
materials); Heltzel Steel Form & I. Co. v. Fidelity & D. Co., 168 Ark.
728, 271 S. W. 325 (1925); Royal Indem. Co. v. Day, 114 Ohio St. 68,
150 N. E. '426 (1926) (rental of a concrete mixer and hoisting engine);
Southern Surety Co. v. Municipal Ex. Co., 61 Okla. 215, 160 Pac. 617
(1916). (rental of a trenching machine); United States Rubber Co, v.
Washington Eng. Co., 86 Wash. 180, 149 Pac. 706, L. R. A. 1915F 951;
Standard Boiler Wks. v. National Sur. Co., 71 Wash. 28, 127 Pac. 573,
43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162 (1912) (repairing work on a steam shovel);
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are not incorporated and are usually not entirely consumed on
the job. A claimant has been held to be not within the pro-
tection of the statute merely because his labor or material has
entered into the preparation of materials for a building. The
part he played may be too remote: for example, labor at a
quarry from which rock is taken for a structure, the repair of
cars used in carrying such rock, wages of men who drove horses
pulling the cars that carried the rock.3 7 The federal statute,
on the other hand, has been construed to include these very
items.3 s Labor and materials supplied to a subcontractor in-
stead of the principal contractor, but going directly into the
performance of the principal contract, are generally held to
be within the protection of the statutory bond.0
Wisconsin Brick Co. v. National Sur. Co., 164 Wis. 535, 10 N. W. 1044
(1917) (freight charges for transporting material). But in Multnomah
Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 87 Ore. 193, 170 Pac. 52-5 (1913),
rent of a caterpillar engine hired by a subcontractor was held within the
statute. And "labor" has been held within the bond even though it was
done by means of horses, tractors, derricks, and laborers on behalf of the
claimant. French v. Powell, 135 Cal. 636, 68 Pac. 92 (1902); Fulghum v.
State, 109 So. 644 (Fla. 1926).
7 In American Guaranty Co. v. Cincinnati Iron & S. Co., 115 Ohio St.
626, 155 N. E. 389 (1927), the court said: "The test of remoteness which
will defeat recovery under our statute does not lie in the relationship of
the various claimants in and of itself; it lies in the requirement that the
materials in question must have entered into the erection."
3s The federal statute has been interpreted very widely so as to include
many things within the phrase "labor and materials in the prosecution of
the work." Brogan v. National Surety Co., supra note 36; (board furnished
for laborers); Title Guaranty Co. v. Crane, 219 U. S. 24, 31 Sup. Ct. 140
(1910) (cartage and towage of material and drawings for making molds for
castings); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 237,
34 Sup. Ct. 88 (1913) (labor at a quarry 50 miles from the breakwater be-
ing built, and repairing of the cars carrying the stone); Illinois Surety Co.
v. John Davis Co., supra note 16 (rental of cars, track and equipment, ex-
pense of loading, and freight).
39 United States v. American Surety Co., 200 U. S. 197, 20 Sup. Ct. 168
(1906); Williams v. Tingey, 26 Cal. App. 574, 147 Pac. 584 (1915); Griffith
v. Stucker, 91 Kan. 47, 136 Pac. 937 (1913); Nash v. Commonwealth, 174
Blass. 335, 54 N. E. 865 (1899), 182 Mlass. 12, 64 N. E. G90 (1902) ; Combs
v. Jackson, 69 Blinn. 336, 72 N. W. 565 (1897); Duby v. Jackson, 69 Minn.
342, 72 N. W. 568 (1897); St. Louis v. Hill-O'Bleara Con. Co., 175 Mo.
App. 555, 158 S. W. 98 (1913); Jackson Co. v. Freeborn Eng. & Con.
Co., 174 Mo. App. 28, 160 S. W. 271 (1913); Strong v. American Fence
Const. Co., 245 N. Y. 48, 156 N. E. 92 (1927); Philadelphia v. Wiggins,
227 Pa. 343, 76 Atl. 31 (1910); Philadelphia v. Nichols Co., smp ,a note 15;
Bowditch v. Gourley, 24 Pa. Super. ,Ct. 342 (1904); Gilmore v. Westerman,
13 Wash. 390, 43 Pac. 345 (1896).
In American Guaranty Co. v. Cincinnati Iron & S. Co., --upra note 37,
the plaintiff supplied steel ready for a building to a materialman who had
contracted with the principal building contractor, and the plaintiff was
held to be a "materialman" within the meaning of the statute.
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Where the bond that is executed is not in conformity with
the statute and omits the provision for protection of third par-
ties they will ordinarily be held to have no rights against the
sfurety, whose obligations are not extended beyond the terms of
the bond executed by him.40 The statute may go so far, how-
ever, as to declare in express words that such surety bonds are
to be regarded as incorporating the provisions of the statute
even though the express words of the bond omit such provisions.
A statute of this type is of a remedial character for the special
protection of those who furnish labor and materials on public
contracts and is to be liberally construed. Sureties have notice
of the statute and will be held in accordance with its provi-
sions.41 Statutory provisions have been read into a bond even
though the statute did not expressly require it,42 and even though
the bond expressly provided that the surety should owe no duty
to anyone other than the named obligee."a
It has been held in New York that a laborer cannot maintain
a separate action on a surety bond of the sort here discussed,
because the bond is given primarily for the benefit and protec-
tion of the state or municipality, and that such protection might
be lost if third parties should be allowed to bring suits tending
to exhaust the amount of penalty of the bond.44 The court
said:
40 McCausland & Co. v. Brown Const. Co., 172 N. C. 708, 90 S. E. 1010
(1916); Aetna Casualty & S. Co. v. Leathers, 33 Ga. App. 444, 126 S. E.
881 (1924); Eau Claire-St. Louis Lumber Co. v. Banks, 136 Mo. App.
44, 117 S. W. 611 (1909); of. United States v. Starr, 20 F. (2d) 803
(C. C. A. 9th, 1927).
4:'Southern Surety Co. v. Chambers, 115 Ohio St. 434, 154 N. E. 786
(1926); American Guaranty Co. v. Cincinnati Iron & Steel Co., supra
note 37.
A statutory provisi6n that a bond given under the statute shall protect
the claims of laborers and materialmen, whether such provision be incor-
porated in the bond or not, will be given effect. See Standard Electric
Time Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 191 N. C. 653, 132 S. E. 808 (1926)
construing Public Laws N. C. 1923, c. 100.
42 Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co. v. Roeser, 103 Neb. 614, 173 N. W. 605
(1919); School Dist. v. Alameda Const. Co., 87 Ore. 132, 169 Pac. 507,
788 (1918) ; Gill v. Paysee, 48 Nev. 12, 226 Pac. 302 (1924) ; Globe Indom-
nity Co. v. Barnes, 281 S. W. 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Southern Surety
Co. v. Klein, 278 S. W. 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Fogarty v. Davis, 305
Mo. 288, 264 S. W. 879 (1924).
"The bond executed does not technically conform to the language of
the statute. However, in spirit, it manifests a purpose and intention to do
so. I am satisfied that the statute of 1913 must be read into the bond in
question." Coleman, J., in Gill v. Paysee, supra.
43 Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Board of Education, 15 F. (2d) 317
(C. C. A 4th, 1926); Ingold v. Hickory, supra note 31; Globe Indem. Co. v.
Barnes, supr. note 42.
44 Fosmire v. National Surety Co., 229 N. Y. 44, 127 N. E. 472 (1920),
citing Eastern Steel Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 227 N. Y. 586, 125 N. E. 917
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"We put our decision upon the single ground that the bond,
read in its entirety, is inconsistent with an intention that the
plaintiff and others in like position should have a right to sue
upon it ...... The dominant purpose of this bond was protec-
tion to the state ...... This dominant purpose will be defeated
if laborers may ignore the people and sue in their own right
They may then sue for wages as often as there is default, and,
exhausting the penalty of the bond, leave nothing for the state."
The argument of the court is not entirely convincing. There
was no showing in the particular case that the state had any
claim or that the penalty of the bond was likely to be exhausted;
and the state might well be left to look after its own interests
in the matter. It is true, however, that there were some dif-
ferences between this case and others apparently contra. In
this case a statute required a bond for the protection of the
state but did not require the bond to protect laborers; the pro-
vision in the bond in favor of laborers was put in without legis-
lative command. It may well be that the plaintiff would have
been given judgment if he had joined the state as a party to the
action and had shown that the state's interests were not im-
perilled. In a later case the same court held that a material-
man could recover where a statute expressly required a bond
for his benefit, and that the judgment would be for the full
amount of the claim unless the defendant showed that there
were other claims that would make a total in excess of the
penalty of the bond.4'
(1919); Buffalo Cement Co. v. McNaughton, 90 Hun 74, affd, 150 N. Y.
702, 51 N. E. 1089 (1898).
The federal statute expressly provides that the United States shall
have a preferred claim and also that all laborers and materialnen must
join in a single suit against the surety, brought not later than twelve
months after final settlement with the United States. If the penalty of
the bond is not sufficient to pay all such claimants, they share pro rata.
See United States v. Blass. Bonding & Ins. Co., sup7a note 33; Manin
v. United States, 215 U. S. 533, 80 Sup Ct. 174 (1910); United States
v. McCord, 233 U. S. 157, 34 Sup. Ct. 550 (1914); Illinois Surety Co. v.
Peeler, 240 U. S. 214, 36 Sup. Ct. 321 (1916); Illinois Surety Co. v.
John Davis Co., supr note 16.
The federal statute in its earlier form did not give any preference to the
United States against the surety. United States Fidelity Co. v. Struthcrs-
Wells Co., 209 U. S. 306, 28 Sup. Ct. 537 (1908); Davidson Marble Co. v.
Gibson, 213 U. S. 10, 29 Sup. Ct. 324 (1909).
45A materialman suing on a statutory bond for his benefit or for
damages for failure to give such a bond can recover no more than "the
pro rata share that would he his" of the penalty of the bond consider-
ing the claims of other beneficiaries. But he makes a prima facie case
by proving his own demand. The burden is thn on the defendant to
produce evidence of other claims that would make the plaintiff's pro rata
share less than the amount of his claim. Strong v. American Fence Const.
Co., 245 N. Y. 48, 156 N. E. 92 (1927).
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Official bonds and public service bonds. Public officials and
persons or companies rendering some kind of public service
are often required to give bond to secure individuals affected
by the public service against loss caused by default therein. The
named obligee is usually the state or municipality or a public
trustee. In such cases it is clear that the individuals are the
beneficiaries intended to be protected and they experience no
difficulty in maintaining suit.46  If the official bond is solely
for the protection of the state or municipality, as it is in the
case of an official treasurer's bond to secure public funds de-
posited with him, third persons are not beneficiaries thereof
and can maintain no action on the bond. Some official bonds
may be for both purposes, in which case what has been said
herein concerning contractors' surety bonds would be applicable.
The Pennsylvania court denies third parties an action on a non-statutory
surety bond in which there was a promise to pay laborers and material-
men. First M. E. Church v. Isenberg, supra note 19; Board of Education
v. Massachusetts B. & I. Co., 252 Pa. 505, 97 Atl. 688 (1916); Lancaster
v. Frescoln, supra note 16 (there was an ordinance authorizing "an addi-
tional bond" for third parties but the bond in suit was not such a bond) ;
Greene County v. Southern Sur. Co., supra note 19. It gives the third
party a remedy, however, either in his own name or that of the state,
on a bond executed in accordance with a statute providing that on public
contracts a bond shall be given assuring payment to the third parties
specified. The fact that the full penalty of the bond might be exhausted
by claims of third parties does not trouble the court, since the protection
of these parties is part of the system of protecting the state's interest.
"We see no reason why the State may not use its own bond in any way
it may be to its greatest advantage. It is sufficient in this case to
know that the liability in this suit does not exceed the amount of the
bond." Commonwealth v. National Sur. Co., 253 Pa. 5, 97 Atl. 1034 (1916) ;
Robertson Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 268 Pa. 309, 112 Atl. 50 (1920). There
are numerous other public bond cases to the same effect.
See also Southwestern Port. Cem. Co. v. Williams, supra note 12, at 383:
"* * * it is manifest that ordinary prudence, exercised by the responsible
officials in fixing the penalty of the bond, and in supervising the work, may
easily avoid any loss, either to the public or to laborers and materialmen."
Under a Massachusetts statute requiring a city to take "sufficient secur-
ity" for payment of laborers and materialmen on a public contract, not
only do the third parties have an enforceable right on the bond against
the surety, but their claim takes precedence over that of the city and
they may exhaust the penalty of the bond to the exclusion of the city.
McNamara v. McGuire, supra note 31 ("bill in equity").
46 Crawford v. Ozark Ins. Co., 97 Ark. 549, 134 S. W. 951 (1911) (bond
to secure holders of insurance policies).
